is known about the factors that influents the compensation of school administrators or their mobility. In particular, it is not known whether superior "performance" by a school district results in rewards for its administrators in the form of higher compensation or greater opportunities fcr mobility to higher-paying positions.* That Q uestion is clearly important for policy ebate; if it is found that school administrators' compensation is not even implicitly tied to their districts' "performance," a case can be made for building explicit incentives for performance into their compensation arrangements.
To shed light on this issue, we have analyzed the compensation and mobility of school superintendents in New York State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period. Our focus is on school superintendents rather than principals not only because the former are the chief operating officers of school districts, but because their salaries are determined through individual "negotiations" with school boards and their salary data were made available to us, whereas school principals-especially those in large districts-tend to be members of a union, with collectively negotiated salary increases, and their salary data were unavailable to us.
Of course, a crucial element in our study is the definition of "performance." School districts and their school board members are idiosyncratic and evaluate superintendents' performance in a wide variety of ways; our methodology, in contrast, is to focus on a few well-defined outcomes. Specifically, we assume that school districts value high educational performance and low school tax rates, each relative to the comparable outcome in similar school districts in the state. 3 1 None of the previous studies (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986 for citations) attempted to measure "performance" and to see if it matters. Indeed, March and March (1977) argued that the mobility of superintendents is almost a random process. Their approach, however, was criticized by Schmitllein and Morrison (1981) . 5 A district can simultaneously have high test scores and low tax rates if the district's administrators efficiently manage both financial and educational
Preliminary Analysis 4
Our analysis utilizes data on the more than 700 school districts in New York State during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 period obtained from the New York State Education Department's "Basic Educational Data System" (BEDS) annual school district tapes. Unfortunately, no data on nonsalary compensation items are available on the BEDS tapes, so we can analyze only salaries rather than total compensation. Excluded from the sample each year were New York City (which, because of die size of its school system and the large number of its local district school boards, is not comparable to any other district in the state), districts in which the superintendent's position was vacant, and districts that failed to report salary information.
The mean salary of superintendents in the sample rose from slightly under $35,000 in 1978-79 to over $44,000 in 1982-83, Each year the variation in salaries across districts was large; for example, in 1982-83 superintendents in the sample earned between $20,000 and $71,000, and the standard deviation in salaries was $10,000. Although much of this variation is clearly due to the wide variation of school district sizes in the sample, we demonstrate below that other factors are also important.
The BEDS data permit us to determine if a superintendent remained in the same school district for two consecutive years, moved from one district to another in the state during the period, or moved from a school district in the state to "out of sample" status. In the last case, the superintendent may have retired or died, moved to another superintendency outside New York State {though previous studies suggest that the vast majority of school superintendents serve in only one state during their lifetime), moved to a different educational position (nonsuperinresources and effectively motivate school district personnel.
''Tables of descriptive statistics on superintendents' salaries and mobility during the period are available in Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg (1986). tendent) in another district in the state, or likely to have a strong "taste" for educaswitched to a noneducational position-or lion), and districts with students who have his school district may simply have failed special educational needs (such as those to report data in the second year, with a large proportion of minority stuThe data suggest that the annual turndents) are all likely to .oay higher salaries over rates of school superintendents were m an effort to attract and retain highonly 12 to 19 percent. Each year only 4 to quality superintendents. Other possible 6 percent of the superintendents moved to factors are characteristics of the superinanother district in the state, and 8 to 13 tendent: it is reasonable to expect more percent dropped out of the sample, experienced and more-highly educated Below, using multinomial logit analysis, we superintendents to command higher attempt to explain the determinants of the salaries. characteristics of the superintendent, and € is a random error term.
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As noted in Table I bents in 1984-85 to the survey was about 70 percent, many observations lacked data on some or all of the superintendents' characteristics. Furthermore, we could not obtain school district data for some of the districts. The exclusion from the sample of observations for which either the school district's characteristics or the superintendent's degree information was missing reductd the sample sizes to between 550 and 600 observations each year.
As expected, the characteristics of school districts prove to be important determinants of superintendents' salaries. Ceteris paribus, in each year, larger districts (as measured by the logarithm of total enrollment, LINK), wealthier districts (as measured by the logarithms of property values per enrolled student [LVAL] , per capita personal income in the county [LYI] A widely accepted generalization about the mobility of superintendents, and one supported by the results of our survey, is that they typically move (at least during the early stages of their careers) from smaller to larger and froi"i poorer to wealthier districts. It may be, therefore, that personal characteristics affect salary indirectly by influencing the characteristics of the school district in which the superintendent is located, rather than directly by influencing salary decisions within a district.
To test this hypothesis, the logarithm of properly value per enrolled student and the logarithm of total enrollment in the superintendent's district were both regressed each year on the personal characteristics of the superintendent (excluding years of tenure in the current district). The results (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986) suggest that having * Both median family income in the ubeel district and per capita income in the county were included a* explanatory variables here (and in pans of the analysis below) because the former was available only in die census year.a doctorate, having more prior experience as a superintendent in other districts, and being older all were associated with employment in larger school districts, and having a doctorate was also associated with being employed in wealthier districts.
These findings have important implications for the analysis that follows of the relationship between superintendents' compensation and school districts' performance. Even if, within a given school district, no relationship is found between a superintendent's compensation and his school district's performance, superintendents might still be rewarded for district performance by increased opportunities for mobility to better-paying positions.
Evaluating the Performance of School Districts
We assume in this study that school boards value high academic test scores (high educational output) and low school tax rates (more money available for other public and private uses), each relative to the comparable outcome in similar school districts in the state, and that they evaluate a superintendent (at least implicitly) by his or her district's performance on these criteria. It is natural to ask how these measures correspond to the criteria that superintendents believe school boards actually use in their evaluation. To answer this question, the survey of school superintendents that we conducted asked the respondents to list the criteria they believed their school boards used in their evaluation. Although we gave keeping test scores high and tax rates low as two examples of criteria that might be used (as well as "maintaining good relations with the board"), the question we asked was open-ended. Each respondent was also asked to attach to the survey form a copy of the formal evaluation instrument in effect at the time of the survey, if there was one. Eighty percent (397) of the 496 respondents to our survey included a list of criteria in their response, and about 22 percent (86) of those 397 attached formal evaluation instruments.
We assigned the criteria mentioned by superintendents to twelve broad classifications and made a count of responses under each classification (Table S) . Since most superintendents mentioned more than one criterion, the total count across categories far exceeds the number of respondents.
Perhaps the most striking result, given that keeping test scores high and tax rates tow were two of the only three examples provided for this item on the questionnaire, is that the most commonly mentioned criteria were community/public relations and school board relations. Fiscal management (the category that would include, but is not limited to, keeping tax rates low) came in fourth on the list and was mentioned by about two-thirds of the respondents. Academic performance and achievement (the category in which keeping test scores high would fall) was eighth on die list and was mentioned by fewer than one-third of the respondents.
What are the implications of these are random, the coefficients of our performance variables will be biased toward zero in the mobility and compensation change equations. Furthermore, given that more than twice as many respondents mentioned fiscal management as did academic performance, one might expect that, on average, the former will prove to be more important than the latter in explaining compensation and mobility.
To show how the performance measures were constructed, in Table 4 we present estimates of tax rate and educational outcome equations for 1979-80. (Separate equations were estimated for each year and the results are very similar across years.) The tax rate variable is the logarithm of the futt-valtte property tax rale in the school district (total school district property tax revenue divided by total value of taxable property in the school district). The educational outcome variables are the logarithms of the percentage of the district's students who fall below the state reference point on a standardized sixth grade mathematics examination and the average percentage who fall below the state reference point on standardized third and sixth grade reading and mathematics examinations.
8 Students who fall below the state reference point are deemed 8 We isolate the sixth grade mathematics lest because k was the only one of the four tests that did not undergo revision during the period and thai was given in all five years. As a result, although the entire battery of tests can be used to construct a performance measure when analyzing a single year's cross-section, the longitudinal analyses in this paper, which pool data across years, are restricted to using the single sixth grade mathematics test. (1) LVAI to pURB-defined as before (see Table 1 to require remedial services, and state aid is increased to help fund these services, Since these outcome scores measure the proportion who "fall" these tests, we are focusing on the bottom tail of the academic achievement distribution,"
For each of these three outcomes (O), equations were estimated of the form * These tests, unfortunately, were the only ones for which the New York State Education Department could give us data, since they are the only tests that all students in the state are required to take. It obviously would have been preferable to have test scores for older students and also to focus some attention on the upper tail of the achievement distribution. For example, data on high school graduation rates, or on the fraction of seniors going on to higher education, would have been desirable. Our focus on the lower tail of the elementary school student test distribution imparts additional error to our educational performance measures, as does the omission of other aspects of educational perfor mance that are not easily measured (such as teaching students to write, or giving them a sense of social responsibility). where Z is a vector of school district characteristics expected to influence these outcomes and « is a random error term. In fact, the variables in (2) are assumed to be identical to (hose school district variables that enter the salary equation, save that a (1,0) "city school district" dummy variable replaces the continuous variable for district size. The dummy variable is included because in the large city school districts in New York State the property tax rate is set by an elected school board (subject to constitutional limitations). whereas in the smaller school districts the school budget, and hence the tax rate, is set each year by a voter referendum. One might conjecture that in the latter situation, ceteris paribus, direct voter control will lead to tower tax rates. In the main, the estimates in Similarly, wealthy districts, districts with high current income, and districts with highly educated adults, ceteris paribus, all have lower failure rates on the academic tests than other districts, and districts with a higher proportion of nonwhites have higher failure rates. Failure rates, but not tax rates, also appear to be higher in the "city" school districts. It is worth noting that the equation used to predict the average test failure rate "fits" much better than the equation used to predict the sixth grade math test failure rate. Although it would be preferable to use the former in our analysis, only the latter can be used in an analysis that exploits the longitudinal nature of the data (see footnote 9, above).
Given these estimated coefficients (cor- To econometrically model this joint wage change-job change-sample exit process would be extraordinarily complex, since both school boards and superintendents are involved in the relevant decision process. The ideal procedure would be to estimate a complete structural "matching model" that contains both employer (school board) and employee (school superintendent) decision rules. Given the limited data we have, however, we instead estimated simpler reduced form models of the form where Y is a vector of characteristics of the school district (a subset of the X in equation I), 5 is the vector of superintendent characteristics, and T and E are the relevant tax rate and educational test score performance measures. The notation /'(state = j) denotes the probability that an individual is in state ;, with the four states being continuing in the same district, moving to a new district with a salary increase, moving to a new district with the same or a lower salary, and exiting from the sample. Under suitable assumptions about the distribution of ttie error terms (i.e., that it is logistic), the system in equation (5) 1980) . Such information would thus come too late to be used to estimate test score performance indexes that could then be used in the decision to t tain the superintendent for 1980-81 or to try lo attract a superintendent from a district that had a higher test score performance index, Thus, the pertinent test score performance measure in a study of superintendent mobility between 1979-80 and 1980-81 is that for 1978-79. Below, we refer to this measure as the lagged year district test performance index.
Unlike comparative data on academic tests, comparative data on base year tax level performance are potentially available to be used in personnel decisions affecting superintendents. But even so, if the processing of such information by the decision-making body is sufficiently delayed, a lagged year tax rate performance index may again be the relevant one to use. Table 5 presents the estimates of the specification of equation (5) that uses the Variable definitions: For most variables, see Table I . MPL: School district math test performance measure in the lagged year in the superintendent's base year school district, TPL: School distria tax rate performance measure in the lagged year in the superintendent's base year school district.
* Statistically significant at the .05 level, lagged year performance level measures (TPL for tax rate performance, MPL for math test score performance). One striking result is that the lagged tax level performance measure (TPL) is positively associated with the odds of moving to a higher-paying job (relative to staying) and negatively associated with the odds of moving to a lower-paying job (relative to staying). Put another way, among movers the better the lagged tax level performance is, the more likely the individual will move to a better job. Thus, it appears that a school district's Financial performance does affect its school superintendent's future. The math performance variable (MPL), in contrast, is always insignificant. The poor predictive power of that variable in comparison with the tax level performance variable is consistent with the questionnaire results described above, As suggested by the cross-section results discussed above (under "Preliminary Analysis"), having a doctorate degree (CDEC) increases a superintendent's chances of moving to a better-paying job relative to his chances of not moving. Older superintendents, as measured by years .since receiving a bachelor's degree (EXPG), are less likely to move to another job and more likely to leave the sample (again, relative to staying in the same district)-findings that clearly reflect the decline of voluntary mobility and increase in retirement rates with age. Previous experience as a superintendent in other districts (EXPS) is positively associated with moves to both higher-paying and lower-paying jobs, relative to staying in the same district, a result that may well reflect heterogeneity of turnover probabilities. (See Chamberlain 1981 or Heckman 1981 for discussion of methods to distinguish heterogeneity bias from other factors.) Finally, employment in a school district with high median family income is associated with a reduced probability of moving to a higher-paying job relative to the probability of staying, As indicated in Table 1 , higher-income school districts pay more than other school districts, thereby reducing the likely gain from mobility.
The last-mentioned result raises the question of whether some measure of the superintendent's |jotemial gain from mobility should be direcdy included in these equations. We experimented with four such measures: the logarithm of the superintendent's base year salary, the residual from a base year log salary equation that included only superintendents* characteristics, the residual from a base year log salary equation that included both superintendents' and school district characteristics, and the residual from a comprehensive base year log salary equation that also included performance measures. None of these measures, however, proved to be statistically significant (when they were included one at a time), nor did their inclusion affect the pattern of signs and significance of the coefficients in Table 5 .
We also tested for the sensitivity of our mobility results to the specification of the performance variables. Four specifications were tested: base year level, lagged year level, both base and lagged year levels, and change between the base and new year. The results (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986) indicate quite clearly that only the lagged level of tax performance is significant, with better performance leading to an increased (decreased) probability of moving to a position with a salary higher than (equal to or lower than) the base year salary, relative to the probability of remaining on the same job.
School District Performance and Superintendent Salary Changes
In this section we examine the question of how salary increases-both for superintendents who remain in the same district for two consecutive years and for those who move to another district in New York State-are related to the lagged year tax rate and test score performance measure in the base year school district.' 2 "Treating mobility at exogenous here leads to obvious potential selectivity problems: we may be Table 6 presents estimates of two salary change equations for superintendents who remained in the sample over two consecutive years. Column (1) presents the simplest model, in which salary change is postulated to be a function only of year dummy variables and a dichotomous variable (M) for whether the superintendent changed jobs (1 =yes,0 = no) during the period. The results in this column suggest that mobility mattered; on average, superintendents who changed jobs received salary increases that were 6 percent higher than those who remained in the same position. It does not follow, however, that mobility always pays. In fact, as noted above, approximately one-fifth of the movers each year failed to increase their salaries; some of these suffered salary losses as large as 30 percent.
Column (2) presents the results of estimating a model in which a superintendent's salary change is also postulated to be a function of the lagged tax rate and math test score performance measures in the superintendent's base year school district, as well as the differences between the base year district and new year distrta in the logarithms of county income, school district enrollment, and school district full value of property per student. (For stayers, the values calculated are simply the within-district changes in the variables between the base and new years.) The coefficients of each of these change variables and the performance measures were allowed to differ between movert; and stayers in this model.
The major result of this specification is the finding that, ceteris paribus, movers suffer salary losses in the range of 5 to 6 confounding the effect of the performance variables on mobility prospects with their effects on salary changes given mobility status. But in the absence of a well-specified structural model of the mobility process that takes account of both school board and superintendent decision rules (sec the discussion headed "School District Performance and Superintendent Mobility," above), any attempt to use the estimates in Table 5 to obtain a Hcckman {1979Mype "selectivity correction" term to add to the mobility equations would be ad hoc at best and subject to specification error. We do not attempt such corrections here. percent relative to stayers. Changes in these variables, however, are positively associated with salary changes for movers but not for stayers. Hence, in order for superintendents to gain from mobility, they must move to either higher-income, larger, or wealthier school districts. This result is fully consistent with the crosssection salary equations presented in Table 2.
The coefficient on the lagged math test performance variable suggests that superintendents who are "stayers" in school districts wit'i above-average math test performance receive larger salary increases than other superintendents who do not change jobs. Tax rate performance appears also to be positively associated with the salary increases of stayers, but the coefficient on that variable is not significant.
The evidence on the effects of performance on the salary changes of superintendents who change jobs is a bit more mixed. The derived estimates (from the stayer and interaction coefficients) of the effects of performance on movers' salary changes are found in the note to the table. Although tagged tax performance in the base year school district is positively associated with earnings gains for superintendents who change jobs, the association with lagged math test performance is negative. We have no explanation for the latter finding, which conflicts with the other results reported here and in the previous section.
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Superintendents' Influence on School District Performance Two presumptions of our papur are that school superintendents can affect our measures of school district performance 13 As in the previous section, inclusion of the superintendent's salary in the base year as an additional explanatory variable did not alter any of the other coefficients. For the subset of school districts for which we had teacher salary data, wc also attempted to test if school superintendents' salary changes were related to the salary changes of teachers in their school district. This variable, however, never proved statistically significant.
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR REIATIONS REVIEW
and that the provision of appropriate financial incentives will encourage them to do so. In this section we investigate the validity of the first presumption. One simple way to test whether superintendent* have had any effect on our measures of school district performance is to assume that (6) ft-J^ + JWu-i +<*.
where Pu a an estimated performance measure (either test score or tax rate) for school district i in year t, d^ is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the particular school district is district j and zero otherwise, n is the number of school districts in the sample (approximately 700), I*-1 is a dichotomous variable equal to one if superintendent k worked in school district i in year t -1 and zero otherwise, and m is the number of superintendents in the sample (approximately 1,000). Equation (6) is a simple analysis of variance model in which a school district's estimated performance measure in a year is specified to depend only on the district and the particular superintendent employed in the district in the previous year.
M If superintendents perse matter, at least some of the 6* should prove to be nonzero.
Conceptually simple though it is, however, equation (6) That is, the change in a performance M The one-year lag it assumed in the case of the tax rate measure because the tax rate in ye»r / is determined by the school board and superintendent in year ( -1. Although ten scores in year t conceivably could depend on the superintendents' actions in year (, a year lag seems reasonable in this case as well. Longer panels of data than we haw would permit experimentation with a variety of lag lengths. index in a school district between year ( and year t -I will be a function of the change in all of the superintendent variables. If the same superintendent was in the school district in years t -1 and t -2, the changes in all these superintendent variables will equal zero. If a change in the superintendent occurred, one variable will equal one and one variable will equal minus one for the district.
The majority of superintendents in our sample stayed in the same school district throughout the sample period; for these people, Itt-1 -ln-2 always equaled zero, and thus their "variables" dropped out of the model. In practice, using performance data for J « 79-80,80-81, and 81-82 and superintendent data for t -1 = 78-79, 79-80, and 80-81 left us with roughly 1,000 "change observations" and 125 coefficients to estimate in <!quation (7).
15 A simple F test of the hypothesis that each coefficient of the vector of 6* coefficients equals zero is then a test of whether superintendents per se influence the school district performance measures.
Both the tax rate and sixth grade math test performance measures were used in the estimation, and in neither case could we reject the null hypothesis that each 6* was equal to zero. That is, we found no evidence that knowledge of who the school superintendent was in one year an help in predicting a school district's tax rate performance measure or its sixth grade math test score performance measure in the following year. Thus, superintendents do not appear to have influenced our measures of school district performance.
Of course, a more complete analysis would experiment with a variety of different lags in equation (6) sample sizes (more years' data). 16 In addition, the weakness of our educational performance measures should be reemphasized. Data limitations have restricted us throughout our analysis to focusing on the lower tail of the achievement distribution in mathematics for one elementary grade level. More complete measures would focus attention on the upper tail, on other subjects, on achievement measures for older students (such as test scores, dropout rates, high school graduation rates, and college attendance rates), and on variables that are less easily measured (such as the success with which students are taught to think critically or instilled with a sense of social responsibility). Clearly, the measure we use as an index of educational performance is measured with considerable error. It is therefore quite possible that we understate both superintendents' effects on educational performance and the effect of educational performance on superintendents' salary changes and mobility.
Concluding Remarks
Are school superintendents rewarded for their school districts' good performance by larger salary increases or greater opportunities for mobility to higherpaying positions? Although the evidence we have presented is somewhat ambiguous, our tentative answer is yes. The belter a school district's tax rate performance measure, other things equal, the more likely that its superintendent will move to a higher-paying job the following year; and among "movers," the better the district's tax rate performance measure, the higher the new salary is likely to be. Also, the better the district's sixth grade mathematics test performance in the previous year, the larger are the salary increases for "stayers." Contrary to our expectations, however, this educational '"For example, wc found similar resulis (no apparent effect of school superintend cuts on school district perform mice) when tve assumed that performance iu |>criiKl I was a function of the superintendent in period f -2.
performance index is negatively associated with salary increases for movers-a finding that gives us some pause as we draw conclusions.
Another important question is whether the rewards superintendents apparently receive for good performance by their districts (on the two measures we use) are great enough to induce them to work harder to improve that performance. Our study does not directly address that question, but judging by the quite modest effects we have found, as well as by the responses to the questionnaire item on the criteria school boards use in their evaluation of superintendents, we would be surprised if the answer were yes.
For example, the estimated coefficients in Table 6 suggest that a superintendent who remained in the same district while his district's math test performance index held steady at one standard deviation above the mean performance index (which is zero) would receive an annual salary increase only 0.3 percentage points higher than that awarded a superintendent who remained in a district with only average performance on the same measure.
17 If the two districts maintained these levels of performance over a ten-year period, the salaries of the superintendents would diverge by only slightly more than 3 percentage points. Similarly, among superintendents who moved to another position, those whose districts' tax rate performance index was one standard deviation above the mean tax rate performance (which again is zero) would receive a salary increase upon moving only 1.7 percentage points higher than the salary increase given a "mean performing mover."
18 In neither case does the incentive seem strong enough to elicit much extra effort from a superintendent to improve his school district's performance.
" This increase is computed as the stayer coefficient for the lagged math performance variable (.007) multiplied by the standard deviation of the math performance variable (.46), 18 This increase is computed as the implied mover coefficient for the lagged tax rate performance variable (.075) multiplied by the standard deviation of the tax rate performance variable (.23).
